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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL-AMBIGUOUS REQUESTS-The United States Supreme Court
held that after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda
rights, officers may continue questioning until the suspect
makes an unambiguous request for counsel.
Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
Robert L. Davis (the "Petitioner") was a member of the Urfited
States Navy stationed at Charleston Naval Base.' On October 2,
1988, the Petitioner was shooting a game of pool with another
sailor, Keith Shackleford (the "Decedent").' The Decedent lost
the game and a thirty dollar wager, but he, refused to pay the
debt.' Early the next morning, the Decedent's body was found
on the loading dock behind the commissary4 beaten to death.5
The Naval Investigative Service (the "NIS") examination even-
tually focused on the Petitioner.' The investigation found that
the Decedent and the Petitioner were both at the same club on
the night of the Decedent's death; the Petitioner did not arrive
for work the next morning; and the Petitioner owned two pool
cues, one of which was stained with blood.! In addition, some
witnesses informed the NIS agents that the Petitioner had ad-
mitted committing the crime to them and others indicated that
he had clearly recounted details that implicated him in the
crime.'
1. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2352 (1994).
2. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2352. They were playing pool at the Enlisted Mens'
Club on the Naval Base. United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 338 (C.M.A. 1993),
affd, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
3. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2352-53.
4. A commissary is a general store on a military base. BLACK'S LAW DicTIo-
NARY 272 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. The pathologist indicated that the injuries sus-
tained were consistent with the type of injury that the butt end of a pool cue would
inflict. Davis, 36 M.J. at 338.
6. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. According to the Armed Forces Act, a general
court-martial cannot begin until a thorough and impartial investigation of all mat-
ters has been completed. See 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988).
7. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
8. Id. The Petitioner told one person the precise cause of death even though
such knowledge was not common. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339. He told another individual
that he did not commit the murder, but that he knew who did. Id.
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In early November 1988, the NIS questioned the Petitioner
and told him that he was a suspect.' Agents advised the Peti-
tioner that he was not required to make a statement, that any
statement could be used against him, and that he could talk
with an attorney and have an attorney present during question-
ing." The Petitioner waived both his right to remain silent and
his right to have counsel present." Approximately ninety min-
utes into the NIS interview, the Petitioner said, "[maybe I
should talk to a lawyer."12 The agents then made it clear to the
Petitioner that if he wanted a lawyer, the agents would stop the
questioning. 3 The Petitioner indicated, however, that he was
not asking for a lawyer, and the interview continued. t4 After
several hours of questioning, the interview was ceased when the
Petitioner asked for the interview to stop until he obtained an
attorney. 5
Based on the NIS investigation, the Petitioner was charged
with murder without premeditation." In the course of the gen-
eral court-martial, 7 the Petitioner moved to suppress the state-
9. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. The Petitioner'was first interviewed on October
20, but at that time he was not advised of his rights because the agents did not
consider him a suspect. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339. During this first interview, the Peti-
tioner told the agents he owned two pool sticks and led the agents to his girlfriend's
house to examine the pool cues. Id.
10. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1988)). The military
standard requires that before an individual can be interrogated or asked to give a
statement, he must be advised that he does not have to make any statement regard-
ing the alleged offense and that any statement made by him may be used as evi-
dence against him in a trial by court-martial. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2353 (citing 10
U.S.C. § 831).
11. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
12. Id.
13. Id. According to the interviewers:
We made it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that if he
wants a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that we
weren't going to pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he asking for
a lawyer or is he just making a comment about a lawyer ....
Davis, 36 M.J. at 339-40.
14. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. According to the NIS agents the Petitioner said,
"[nlo, I'm not asking for a lawyer" and then the Petitioner continued, "[n]o, I don't
want a lawyer." Id. After a short break, before the interrogation continued, the Peti-
tioner was reminded that he had a right to remain silent and to have counsel pres-
ent, but again the Petitioner did not invoke either of these rights and the interview
continued for another hour. Id.
15. Id. At this point, the Petitioner stated, "I think I want a lawyer before I
say anything else." Id.
16. Davis, 36 M.J. at 338-40.
17. A court-martial is a military court, specially convened under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (the "UCMJ") to adjudicate violations of the UCMJ. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 354-55 (6th ed. 1990). The military courts are courts of law and
courts of justice, but are not part of the federal judiciary established under Article
III of the Constitution. Id. A general court-martial has a military judge and at least
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ments made during the NIS investigation.'8 The military judge
denied the motion. 9 The Petitioner was convicted on one speci-
fication" of murder without premeditation and was sentenced
to life imprisonment." The Petitioner appealed the conviction,
but'the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review2 affirmed both
the findings and the sentence."
The United States Court of Military Appeals24 granted dis-
cretionary review and affirmed the sentence.25 The appeals
court concluded that because the Petitioner did not "unequivo-
cally invoke" his right to counsel, the NIS agents properly clari-
fied the Petitioner's ambiguous statement and correctly contin-
ued on with the questioning. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of the procedure to
be followed when a suspect made an ambiguous or equivocal
reference for counsel during a custodial interrogation."
four other individuals. 10 U.S.C. § 816. Alternatively, before the court is convened,
the accused can request, subject to the military judge's approval, a court consisting
of only a military judge. Id.
18. Davis, 36 M.J. at 340.
19. Id. at 341. The judge held that the Petitioner's mention of a lawyer during
the NIS investigation was not in the form of a request for an attorney and that the
NIS agents adequately determined that the Petitioner was not exercising his right to
counsel. Id.
20. A specification is merely a detailed account of the charge. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1399 (6th ed. 1990).
21. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
22. The Courts of Military Review are intermediate appellate criminal courts
that review court martial findings. BACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 362 (6th ed. 1990).
Each court has one or more panels of at least three appellate military judges; the
court may sit in panels or en banc. Id.
23. Davis, 114 S. Ct at 2353. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Re-
view opinion was unpublished. Davis, 36 M.J. at 338.
24. The Court of Military Appeals is a civilian appellate tribunal that reviews
court martial convictions of each branch of the services. BLACK'S Lw DICTIONARY
358 (6th ed. 1990). The court consists of three civilian judges appointed by the Pres-
ident. Id.
25. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
26. Davis, 36 M.J. at 342.
27. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354; see Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 379
(1993) (granting certiorari). In Miranda, the Court defined custodial interrogation as
.questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) In Davis, the appeals court noted that
there were three varying approaches being used when addressing the issue of ambig-
uous statements made by suspects in custodial interrogations regarding their right to
counsel. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341. Some jurisdictions declared that any mention of a
lawyer by the suspect required that all questioning cease. Id.; see also People v.
Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (Cal. 1975). A second approach attempted to
determine a threshold standard of clarity, and if the suspect's request did not sur-
pass that standard, questioning could continue. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341; see also Peo-
ple v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980). Finally, a third approach required
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,2' first noted that
before proceedings were officially initiated a criminal suspect
had no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. 29 How-
ever, the Court recognized that in Miranda v. Arizona," the
Court acknowledged that an individual in a custodial interroga-
tion did have the right to consult with an attorney and have an
attorney present during questioning."' Further, the Supreme
Court noted that Miranda established that the police had to
explain these rights to the individual before questioning could
proceed.3 2
The Court also reviewed a second protection afforded subjects
of custodial interrogations that was identified in Edwards v.
Arizona.3 In Edwards, the Court held that once a suspect re-
quested counsel during the interview questioning could not con-
tinue until a lawyer was made available to the suspect. 4 The
protection in Edwards required courts to determine if a suspect
had invoked his right to counsel."
In Davis, the Court found that if the suspect's reference to an
attorney was ambiguous or equivocal, questioning need not
stop."6 The Court held that the suspect had to unambiguously
request counsel, and any request that failed to meet this stan-
dard would not require the officers to stop the questioning.37
The Court asserted that Miranda warnings"9 provided the
that questioning ceased upon an ambiguous statement, but allowed police to ask
narrow questions for the purpose of determining the true meaning of the ambiguous
statement. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341; see also Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768,
771-72 (5th Cir. 1979).
28. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2352. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the majority opinion. Id. Justice Scalia also filed a
separate concurring opinion. Id. Justice Souter concurred in an opinion joined by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. at 2357.
29. Id. at 2354.
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-73). The Court
noted that the right to counsel established in Miranda, while not required by the
Constitution, was essential to protect the constitutionally guaranteed right against
compulsory self-incrimination. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354. The Court noted that con-
stitutional precedent applied to court-martials as well as state and federal cases. id.
32. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-73).
33. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).
34. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
35. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
36. Id.
37. Id. The Court recognized that requiring such an unequivocal request from
some suspects who might be scared or intimidated, or who lacked a strong grasp of
the English language, could put some suspects at a disadvantage. Id. at 2356.
38. In Miranda, the Supreme Court established that the following warnings
should be given to a suspect before questioning begins: "that he has a right to re-
main silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
1112 Vol. 33:1109
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suspect's primary rights, and although Edwards gave additional
protection, its protection had to be positively asserted.39 In con-
clusion, the Court held that after a knowing and voluntary waiv-
er of the Miranda rights, officers could continue questioning
until or unless the suspect clearly requested counsel."
Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion,4 took issue with the
Court's position concerning clarification questions when a sus-
pect makes an equivocal or ambiguous statement.2 Justice
Souter challenged the majority's conclusion that even if the NIS
investigators had not asked any clarifying questions, they could
have continued the questioning because the Petitioner did not
clearly request counsel.' Justice Souter asserted that the prop-
er rule should be that if the suspect made a statement that
might be understood as a request for an attorney, substantive
questioning should cease, and the investigator's questions should
be confined to verifying whether the suspect was invoking his
right to counsel." Justice Souter noted that Miranda was de-
signed to assure an individual's right to choose silence through-
out an interrogation with due regard to the actual practices and
procedures that occur in a custodial interrogation." The concur-
ring Justice asserted that the majority's approach failed to rein-
force these precepts.46 Justice Souter noted the irony in the
Court's acknowledgment that criminal suspects, often lacking a
strong command of the English language, were thrown into
unfamiliar surroundings and subjected to a menacing police
interrogatory, yet required to use perfect English in invoking
their right to counsel."
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appoint-
ed." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
39. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. The Petitioner's suggestion that Edwards should
be expanded to require officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of
an ambiguous or equivocal statement was rejected by the Court. Id. at 2355.
40. Id. The Court noted that it would often be "good police practice" for the
officers to ask clarifying questions when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal
statement, yet refused to adopt any rule requiring such clarifying questions. Id.
41. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358-59 (Souter, J., concurring). Justices Blacknun,
Stevens and Ginsburg joined in the concurrence. Id. Justice Scalia, also filed a con-
curring opinion, and contended that the government should have brought this case
under the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act which governs the admissibility of
confessions in federal proceedings. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1988)).
42. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358-64 (Souter, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2364.
45. Id. Justice Souter contended that the first safeguard of Miranda was to
assure that the suspect's right to choose to remain silent was unrestricted through-
out the interrogation process. Id. at 2360.
46. Id. at 2359.
47. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384
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Justice Souter also took issue with the Court's contention that
requiring an unambiguous request for counsel would enhance
society's interest in effective law enforcement.48 He noted that
although some confessions would be forfeited with his approach,
Miranda itself has caused many confessions to be inadmissible
at trial.4" The concurrence also disagreed with the Court's con-
tention that the requirement for an unequivocal request for
counsel allowed ease of application." Justice Souter concluded
that his approach would actually be easier to apply.5 Only
through the use of clarifying questions, would ambiguities be
resolved.52
The protection against self-incrimination during interrogation
is grounded in the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. 5' The
Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant has
"the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."5' The first case that
interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was Powell v.
Alabama.55 In Powell, the issue was the defendant's right to
counsel before trial." The petitioners were indicted and ar-
raigned on a rape charge, but were not provided with counsel
until after the arraignment hearing.57
On appeal, the Supreme Court first addressed the trial judge's
appointment of all members of the bar to represent the petition-
U.S. at 457). Additionally, Justice Souter remarked that the majority incorrectly put
the burden on the suspect to show that he or she made an unequivocal request for
counsel. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring).
48. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 2362. The concurrence quoted Escobedo v. Illinois, in which the
Court stated that "[n]o system worth preserving should have to fear that if an ac-
cused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise
his constitutional rights." Id. (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964)).
50. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2363.
52. Id.
53. The Sixth Amendment provides that, "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial . . . and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. TV.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
56. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50.
57. Id. at 49-50. The three petitioners were African-American males accused of
raping two white girls. Id. The trial judge appointed all the members of the bar to
act as counsel during arraignment. Id. at 56. It was not determined until the begin-
ning of the trial which specific attorney would represent the petitioners. Id. The
trial took one day and the petitioners were found guilty of rape and sentenced to
death. Id. at 50. The petitioners challenged their convictions on three. different
grounds. Id. First, they contended that they did not receive a fair trial. Id. Second,
they contended that they were denied the right to counsel, including the normal
incidents of pre-trial consultation with counsel. Id. Finally, the petitioners claimed
that qualified members of their own race were excluded from the jury. Id.
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ers during arraignment.' The Supreme Court found the ges-
ture to be worthless because the appointment accorded no repre-
sentation to the petitioners at arraignment.59 The Court next
noted that the Alabama Constitution provided that the accused
in a criminal trial had the right to counsel.' The Court rea-
soned, however, that to exercise that right only at trial, and not
to provide a lawyer during the preparation phase of a criminal
case would defeat the purpose of that right.61
The Supreme Court held that when a defendant in a capital
case 62 was unable to obtain counsel or adequately represent
himself, it was the duty of the court, whether requested or not,
to assign counsel.63 The Court concluded that such a duty in-
cluded ensuring that counsel was available at the early stages of
the criminal proceeding, to ensure adequate preparation for
trial."
The Supreme Court next addressed the accused's ability to
waive his right to counsel, and how the waiver must be ex-
pressed by the accused in Johnson v. Zerbst.' In Johnson, the
petitioner was arrested for feloniously uttering and passing"
four counterfeit twenty dollar Federal Reserve notes."7 The pe-
titioner was represented by counsel during preliminary hearings,
but was unable to secure counsel for trial."
The Supreme Court first noted that the Sixth Amendment
provided the accused in a criminal case with the right to coun-
sel.69 The Court then noted that the presumption was that, un-
58. Id. at 56.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 59-60.
61. Powell, 287 U.S. at 59.
62. A capital case is a case where the verdict could result in a death sen-
tence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (6th ed. 1990).
63. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
64. Id.
65. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
66. Uttering and passing is to offer, whether accepted or not, a forged in-
strument, by representing (by words or actions) that it is genuine. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1547 (6th ed. 1990).
67. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 459-60.
68. Id. at 460. At arraignment, the petitioner pled not guilty and informed the
court that he did not have an attorney for trial. Id. At trial, which immediately
followed arraignment, the trial court asked if the petitioner was ready for trial, to
which he responded affirmatively. Id. The petitioner never asked the court to pro-
vide counsel, but did make the request to the district attorney. Id. The petitioner
was found guilty and sentenced to four and one-half years in jail. Id. The petitioner,
while imprisoned, applied for a writ of habeas corpus and was denied by the district
court. Id. at 458-59. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue from the perspective that the petitioner did not know he had a
right to counsel. Id.
69. Id. at 462. The Court articulated that the purpose of the Sixth Amend-
1995 1115
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der normal circumstances, a defendant would not waive his right
to counsel."0 The Court declared that the determination of
whether a waiver had been made by a defendant depended on
the facts of each case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.7 The Court opined that because the
purpose of the right to counsel was to protect an accused from
his own ignorance, the right would be worthless if it were nulli-
fied when an accused's lack of knowledge precluded him from
exercising the right.72 In reversing the conviction and remand-
ing the case, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had to
determine if the petitioner did indeed waive his right to coun-
sel.73
The Supreme Court next considered whether the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance to counsel was applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment74 in Betts v.
Brady.78 In Betts, the petitioner was indicted for robbery. v
The petitioner, at arraignment, told the judge that he did not
have the money to hire a lawyer and requested that counsel be
appointed.77 The trial judge refused."
The Supreme Court determined that the right to assistance of
counsel had not been considered a fundamental right, but rather
ment was to protect the average defendant, who had no legal training, from a tribu-
nal that had the ability to deprive the defendant of life and/or liberty. Id. at 462-63.
70. Id. at 462-64. The Court defined a waiver as "an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
71. Id.
72. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
73. Id. at 469.
74. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355
(1963).
76. Betts, 316 U.S. at 456.
77. Id.
78. Id. The trial judge told the petitioner that the local practice was to pro-
vide counsel only when indigent defendants were accused of murder or rape. Id. at
457. Without waiving his right to counsel, the petitioner acted as his own counsel.
Id. The trial judge found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to eight years
imprisonment. Id. at 457. The petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus to the
Circuit Court for Washington County, Maryland and later to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, claiming that he had been denied his right to counsel guaranteed to him
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Both courts rejected the petitioner's argument.
Id. The Supreme Court noted that the Sixth Amendment applied only to trials in
the federal courts. Id. at 461 n.9 (citing United States v. Dawson, 15 How. 467, 487
(1853) and Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 321, 325 (1868)). Additionally, the
Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the specific guaran-
tees of the Sixth Amendment. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461-62 n.10 (citing Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) and Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)).
1116
1995 Recent Decisions 1117
had been considered one of legislative policy.7" In affirming the
petitioner's conviction, the Supreme Court concluded that while
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a conviction and impris-
onment based on an unfair trial, the amendment did not include
an absolute right to assistance of counsel in every criminal ac-
tion."
Although heavily criticized,"1 the Betts decision stood for fif-
teen years, until Gideon v. Wainwright.2 In Gideon, the Court
again considered whether the Sixth Amendment applied to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The petitioner was charged with breaking and
entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemean-
or." At trial, the petitioner requested that the trial court ap-
point counsel, but the trial judge refused. 5
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment demanded that any provision of the Bill
of Rights that was "fundamental and essential to a fair trial"
had to be recognized by the states." The Court disagreed with
79. Betts, 316 U.S. at 465-71. The Court reviewed the original constitutions of
the thirteen states and present-day state constitutions and statutes. Id. Rhode Is-
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland and New York had no
provision in their original constitutions granting a right to counsel. Id. at 465-66
(citations omitted). Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Delaware,
Connecticut, Massachusetts and Georgia eventually placed into their constitutions a
right to the effect that the accused should be allowed counsel. Id. The Supreme
Court concluded that this material showed that the states did not consider the right
to counsel fundamental, but rather merely deemed the matter as legislative policy.
Id. at 467.
80. Id. at 473. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that Powell and
Johnson supported the argument that the right to counsel applied to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 462-63. The petitioner reasoned that Powell and
Johnson suggested that the right to assistance of counsel was so fundamental and
essential to a fair trial that to deny the right was a violation of the petitioner's due
process right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
81. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court noted that there were numerous deci-
sions and commentaries that criticized the result in Betts. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 338 n.2 (1963).
82. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
83. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336-38.
84. Id. at 337. Under Florida law, breaking and entering with the intent to
commit a misdemeanor was classified as a felony offense. Id.
85. Id. Only an individual charged with a capital offense could have counsel
appointed. Id. The petitioner represented himself and gave an opening statement,
cross-examined witnesses presented by the state and presented witnesses on his
behalf. Id. At the close of trial the petitioner was found guilty. Id. While incarcerat-
ed, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Florida Supreme
Court attacking the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel. Id. The petitioner alleged
that the trial court's action denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. Id.
86. Id. at 342. The Court noted that in Powell, the Court asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment "embraced those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:1109
Betts that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of
counsel was not a fundamental right. 7 The Court noted that
ten years before Betts the right had been recognized as funda-
mental in Powell." The Supreme Court held that any accused
individual who was too poor to employ counsel could only be
assured a fair trial if counsel was provided. 9 The Court there-
fore reversed the petitioner's conviction.'
The Court next interpreted the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel in Massiah v. United States."1 In Massiah, incriminat-
ing statements made to a co-defendant were overheard by the
police by way of electronic equipment.92 The petitioner had in-
voked his right to counsel during the indictment; after his re-
lease on bail, however, he made several incriminating state-
ments recorded through police surveillance.93 These statements,
were admitted at trial over defense counsel's objections, and the
petitioner was convicted.94
The Court reaffirmed its assertion that once an individual was
indicted, questioning without the presence of counsel, violated
the basic inclination of fairness and the basic rights of persons
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." Id. at 341 (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932)).
87. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
88. Id. at 342-43. The Court noted that the Powell holding was limited to the
particular facts and circumstances at issue, but the conclusion that the right to
counsel was fundamental was clear. Id. at 343.
89. Id. at 344.
90. Id. at 345. The Supreme Court noted that Betts departed from the wisdom
and reasoning on which Powell rested. Id. Florida, and two other states, argued that
Betts should be upheld, but twenty-two other states disagreed and called Betts "an
anachronism when handed down." Id.
91. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
92. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03. The petitioner was a merchant seaman as-
signed to the S.S. Santa Maria. Id. at 202. The petitioner had been arrested, ar-
raigned and indicted for the possession of narcotics while aboard a U.S. vessel. Id.
Possession of narcotics aboard a U.S. vessel was a violation of the federal narcotics
laws. See 21 U.S.C. § 184a (1988). After retaining an attorney, petitioner pleaded
not guilty and was released on bail. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202. A co-defendant was
released at the same time. Id. Unbeknownst to the petitioner, the co-defendant had
agreed to cooperate with the police. Id.
93. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 203. The government agents, with the co-defendant's
consent, placed a radio transmitter under the front seat of his automobile, and the
government agent sat in another car equipped with a radio receiver. Id.
94. Id. The actual trial was based upon a second superseding indictment
which included additional counts. Id. at 203 n.4. The petitioner alleged that his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the government had de-
liberately elicited incriminating statements from him after he was indicted and in
the absence of his retained counsel. Id. at 203-04. The petitioner also alleged that
the use of the radio equipment violated his Fourth Amendment right. Id. at 203.
The alleged Fourth Amendment violation was not addressed by the Court. Id. at
204.
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charged ,with a crime." The Court reasoned that the situation
in Massiah was especially violative of the Sixth Amendment be-
cause the petitioner did not even know that he was under inter-
rogation." In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held
that the petitioner was denied his basic protection of the Sixth
Amendment because the government agents elicited the state-
ments after his indictment in the absence of his counsel.97
In Escobedo v. Illinois," the Supreme Court reviewed an
individual's constitutional right to counsel before trial or ar-
raignment.99 In Escobedo, the petitioner, before being formally
charged, was handcuffed and placed into a police car and taken
to the police station.' When the petitioner's lawyer arrived at
the police station, he was not permitted to see the petitioner.'
After repeatedly asking for his attorney, the police told the peti-
tioner that his lawyer did not want to talk to him.
0 2
The Court opined that in a case where the investigation had
become so focused, the suspect was equal to an accused.' 3 The
Court reasoned that as the questioning continued, and a suspect
becomes highlighted, the suspect had the same constitutional
rights as if he was indicted.0 4 The Court held that when an
investigation moved from a general inquiry of an unsolved
95. Id. at 204-05.
96. Id. at 206.
97. id. at 207.
98. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
99. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479.
100. Id. During the ride, police told the petitioner that someone had named
him as the one who shot the deceased and that he might as well confess. Id. On
the ride to the station, the petitioner indicated he would not say anything until he
talked to his lawyer. Id.
101. id. at 480. The attorney first talked with the duty sergeant who told the
attorney that the petitioner had been moved from lockup to the homicide bureau
and that he could not see him. Id. The attorney next talked to several homicide
detectives who also told the attorney that he could not. see his client. Id. The attor-
ney was then told he could not see his client because the police had not completed
questioning. Id.
102. Id. at 481. After several hours of questioning, the petitioner finally admit-
ted some knowledge of the crime, and eventually made further incriminating state-
ments. Id. at 482-83. During the interrogation the petitioner was handcuffed and
had to remain standing. Id. at 482. An officer who grew up in the petitioner's neigh-
borhood and also spoke the petitioner's primary language, Spanish, allegedly told the
petitioner that if he implicated a co-defendant, he could go home. Id. at 482. The
petitioner told the officer that the co-defendant, who said that the petitioner was the
shooter, was lying, so the officer arranged for the two to confront each other. Id. at
482-83. During the confrontation, the petitioner said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did
it," thus, for the first time indicating his knowledge about the crime. Id. The police
acknowledged that the petitioner was never advised of his constitutional rights. Id.
at 483.
103. Id. at 490-91.
104. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 492.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:1109
crime, and began to focus on an individual certain rights
arose."°5 Specifically, the court contended that when an indi-
vidual was brought to the police station for questioning and the
individual was not advised of his right to remain silent, the
accused was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 6
Two years later, in Miranda v. Arizona,07 the Court articu-
lated specific safeguards to protect the constitutional rights of a
suspect who was not yet officially arraigned or indicted.' At
issue was the admissibility of a suspect's written confession
made during a custodial interrogation when he was not advised
of his right to counsel and was denied the ability to speak with
an attorney when he requested counsel."M The written confes-
sion was allowed into evidence and the petitioner was convicted
of kidnapping and rape."'
On appeal, the Court noted that constitutional rights could be
violated during incommunicado interrogations in a police domi-
nated atmosphere."' The Court concluded that a strong rela-
105. Id. at 490-91.
106. Id.
107. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
108. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
109. Id. at 439-40. The petitioner was arrested and taken to the Phoenix police
station. Id. at 491. The petitioner was brought to the police station in connection
with a kidnapping and rape investigation. Id. at 492. After two hours of questioning,
the officers emerged with a signed confession. Id. at 491-92. The written confession
contained a typed portion stating that the confession was voluntary and not the
result of any threats or promises. Id. at 492. Additionally, the statement indicated
that the confession was made with full knowledge of his legal rights and with the
understanding that the confession could be used against him. Id. The interrogating
officers admitted that the petitioner was not advised that he had a right to have an
attorney present during questioning. Id. at 491. One of the officers said that he did
read the written statement to the petitioner, however, that reading took place after
the petitioner had already orally confessed. Id. at 492 n.67.
110. Id. at 492. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona found no constitu-
tional violations and affirmed. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court relied heavily on the
fact that the petitioner never requested counsel. Id.
111. Id. at 445. The Court noted several studies from the 1930's that highlight-
ed the earlier police practices of physical abuse during incommunicado interrogations.
Id. at 445 n.5 (citing IV National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931); Bates Booth, Confessions, and
Methods Employed in Procuring Them, 4 S. CAL. L. REV. 83 (1930); and Kauper,
Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L.
REV. 1224 (1932)). These reports illustrated that police violence during interrogations
was commonplace. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. The Court also made reference to the
Commission on Civil Rights, which had in 1961, shown that some police still resort-
ed to violence during incommunicado interrogations. Id. (citing Comm'n on Civil
Rights Rep., Justice, pt. 5, at 17 (1961)). The Court also undertook a lengthy review
of police manuals and texts that demonstrated some of the psychological practices
used to obtain statements during custodial interrogations. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-
49. The manuals advised that the "principal psychological factor contributing to a
successful interrogation is privacy." Id. at 449 n.10 (citing INSAU & REID, CRIMINAL
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tionship existed between police questioning of a suspect and that
suspect's right against self-incrimination.1
2
In reversing the petitioner's conviction, the Supreme Court
reasoned that because the petitioner was not advised of his right
against self-incrimination nor advised of his right to counsel, the
statements were inadmissible."'3 The Court held that a prose-
cutor could not use any statements resulting from a custodial in-
terrogation unless the prosecutor established that procedural
safeguards which effectively secured the accused's rights were
used."' The Court articulated several procedural safeguards
needed to secure the rights of the accused.' 5 The Court con-
cluded that if the accused indicated "in any manner and at any
stage of the process" his desire to speak to an attorney, further
questioning was prohibited." '
In Edwards v. Arizona,"7 the Supreme Court considered
whether police could initiate communication after the suspect
invoked his right to counsel."' The petitioner, after invoking
his Miranda rights, was approached the next day, re-advised of
his rights and questioned by the police."9 Statements obtained
from this subsequent questioning session were then used against
the petitioner.' The Supreme Court held that once the ac-
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962)). The manuals also advised that a show of
hostility may be effective. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 n.10 (citing O'HARA, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956)). The manuals also discussed ways to get
around a suspect's refusal to talk and requests for an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 454 n.20 (citing INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(1962)). The manual suggested that the questioner should tell the suspect that he
had that right, but then the officer should point out the incriminating nature of
those requests. Miranda,.384 U.S. at 454. The authors asserted that few suspects
would persist in their request if this technique was used properly. Id.
112. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
113. Id. at 492.
114. Id. at 444. The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initi-
ated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or oth-
erwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
115. Id. Specifically, the accused, prior to any questioning, must be advised that
he has a right to remain silent, that anything he does say can be used against him,
and he has the right to have counsel present during questioning. Id. The accused
can waive any or all of these rights, but such a waiver must not only be voluntary,
but also made knowingly and intelligently. Id.
116. Id. at 444-45.
117. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
118. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479-81.
119. Id. The petitioner was arrested and charged with robbery, burglary and
first-degree murder. Id. at 478. At the police station, the petitioner was informed of
his rights and agreed to talk with the officers. Id. The petitioner sought to make a
deal, but when he discovered that the officer could not make a deal, the petitioner
invoked his right to counsel, and all questioning stopped. Id. at 479.
120. Id. The next day, two different officers came to the jail to talk to the
petitioner. Id. The petitioner refused to speak to the officers, but was told by the
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cused had invoked his right to counsel, the accused was not
subject to further interrogation until counsel was available to
him.12' The Court noted that the only exception to that rule
was if the accused initiated such communication.' 2' The Court
reasoned that while Miranda allowed the accused to waive those
rights, if the accused invoked them, additional safeguards were
necessary to protect him from being badgered into answering
questions.12
The Supreme Court declared two particular safeguards to
protect the accused once he invoked his right to counsel.
124
First, once the right was invoked all questioning had to cease,
and the police were forbidden from initiating any further con-
tact.'25 Second, a waiver of the right to counsel could not be
proven by simply showing that an accused responded to police-
initiated questioning.'26
Two years later, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 7 the Supreme
Court further clarified its holding in Edwards.2  At issue in
Bradshaw was whether a question asked by the respondent
after he invoked his right to counsel was an initiation that
would allow police to continue questioning.'29 The respondent
invoked his right to counsel, and then asked the officer what
was going to happen next.' This inquiry led to a lengthy dis-
cussion that resulted in incriminating statements.'
prison guard that he had to. Id. The officers advised him of his rights and petition-
er agreed to talk with them and eventually implicated himself through incriminating
statements. Id.
121. Id. at 484.
122. Id.
123. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
124. Id. at 484-85.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 484.
127. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
128. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.
129. Id. at 1042-44.
130. Id.
131. Id. During questioning, the respondent requested an attorney and ques-
tioning stopped. Id at 1041-42. Later, the respondent asked the officer "[wlell, what
is going to happen to me now?" Id. at 1042-44. The officer told him that he did not
have to say anything else and respondent said he understood, but continued to talk
to the officer. Id. at 1042. During this conveisation, the officer suggested that a lie
detector test might help the respondent, and the next day, after the respondent
signed a waiver of his rights, he took the test. Id. At trial, over the respondent's ob-
jections, the statements were admitted into evidence and the respondent was found
guilty. Id. at 1043. The respondent was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, driv-
ing while under the influence of intoxicants, and driving while his license was re-
voked. Id. The Oregon Court of Appeals applied Edwards and concluded that the
statements were obtained in violation of the respondents Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. The court of appeals reasoned that the respondent's question was not an initia-
1122
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The Supreme Court asserted that Edwards required a two
step process to determine if the right to counsel had been
waived. ' 2 First, whether the police or the accused re-initiated
the contact had to be determined. 3' If the accused had initiat-
ed the contact, the court had to determine whether the accused
made a valid waiver of his previously invoked right to coun-
sel.13 4 The Supreme Court determined that the respondent did
waive his previously invoked right when the respondent made
further inquiries.' The Bradshaw decision clarified that an
initiation of communication by the accused and a waiver of the
right to counsel were separate issues."6 The Court concluded
that a subsequent initiation of communication did not indicate
that the accused's previous invocation of a right to counsel was
ambiguous.'37
In Smith v. Illinois,3  the Supreme Court addressed the
problem of an accused who invoked his right to counsel, but then
continued to answer the police investigator's questions.13'9 At
tion and was therefore not a waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. Id.
at 1044.
132. Id. at 1044. (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)). The Su-
preme Court asserted that Edwards was misapplied by the court of appeals.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1042-44. The Court disagreed with the court of appeal's find-
ing that the respondent's question was not an initiation of further communication.
Id. at 1045.
133. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46. Because in Bradshaw the initiation was
by the accused, the Supreme Court contended that there was no violation of the
first requirement. Id.
134. Id. at 1046.
135. Id. at 1046-47. The Supreme Court noted that the determination of wheth-
er a waiver was knowing and intelligent depended on the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. Id. at 1046. The trial court found, based on the facts at
trial, that the respondent did voluntarily and knowingly waive his right and the Su-
preme Court did not dispute the trial court's finding. Id.
136. Id. at 1045.
137. Id.
138. 469 U.S. 91 (1984).
139. Smith, 469 U.S. at 93. The officers, in the process of reading the petition-
er his Miranda rights, told the petitioner he had a right to have an attorney pres-
ent during questioning, and the conversation continued:
A. Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that.
Q. Okay.
The officers then continued reading the Petitioner his Miranda rights.
Q. . . . If you want a lawyer . . . do you understand that?
A. Okay.
Q. Do you wish to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present?
A. Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really.
Q. Well. You either have to agree to talk to me without a lawyer being pres-
ent and if you do agree to talk with me without a lawyer being present you
can stop at any time you want to.
Q. All right. I'll talk to you then.
Id. The prosecutor argued that because the accused continued to answer questions,
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issue, was whether the suspect's subsequent responses, after he
invoked his right to counsel could be used to show that his ini-
tial request for counsel was ambiguous. 4 ' The Supreme Court
ruled that the accused's responses, after invoking his right to
counsel, could not be used to cloud his initial request for coun-
sel.14' In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that in-
voking the right to counsel and the waiver of that right were
separate and distinct."" The Court concluded that once the ac-
cused invoked his right to counsel, statements made afterward
were only germane to whether there was a waiver and not
whether the statement was ambiguous.'
In Connecticut v. Barrett,'44 the respondent in a custodial
interrogation was advised of his Miranda rights and signed an
acknowledgement that he had been made aware of his
rights. 4" The respondent admitted his involvement in a crime,
and then at trial, moved to suppress his oral statements.4 '
The trial court allowed the statements to be admitted and held
that the respondent understood his rights and had voluntarily
waived his right to counsel.'47
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a limited
invocation of the right to counsel 4s acted as an all-inclusive
his initial request was ambiguous, and therefore, officers were not required to dis-
continue questioning. Id. at 94. At trial, the petitioner moved to suppress the state-
ments, but the trial judge denied his r~quest, and the petitioner was subsequently
convicted. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petitioner's re-
quest was, given the totality of the conversation, ambiguous, therefore, officers had
no requirement to stop their questioning. Id.
140. Id. at 97.
141. Id. at 100.
142. Id. at 98.
143. Id. The Court noted that lower courts had adopted conflicting standards
when an accused made an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. Id. at
95. However, the Supreme Court declined to address that issue in this case because
the petitioner's request was a clear and unequivocal request for counsel. Id. at 95-
96.
144. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
145. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 525. The suspect agreed to talk to police, but said he
did not want to make a written statement until his attorney was present. Id.
146. Id. at 525-26.
147. Id. at 526. The respondent was subsequently convicted. Id. On appeal, the
Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the respondent's desire for counsel
before making a written statement served as an all encompassing invocation of his
right to counsel. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court used the rule established in
Smith and held that because defendant did not initiate the conversation, the state-
ments were improperly admitted: Id. at 527.
148. The limited invocation was exhibited here by the respondent's receiving
and understanding his Miranda rights, and waiving the right as far as making oral
statements was concerned, but invoking the right concerning written statements. Id.
at 526.
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invocation.149 The Court held that a clear limited request in-
voking one of the respondent's rights had to be respected by po-
lice.60 The Court reasoned that case law allowed a suspect to
exercise his own will in making statements, so that a limited
request'' had to be honored.' 2  The Court rejected the
respondent's argument for a broad construction of the law per-
taining to requests for counsel." 3
Prior to Davis v. United States lower courts employed three
varying approaches to respond to ambiguous requests for coun-
sel.' 4 Some jurisdictions declared that any mention of a law-
yer required that all questioning stop.' 5 A second approach set
a threshold standard of clarity, and if the request for counsel did
not meet that level, questioning could continue.' Finally,
some jurisdictions required that once an accused made an am-
biguous statement, substantive questioning had to stop, but
allowed police to ask narrow questions to determine the mean-
ing of the suspect's ambiguous statement. 7 In Davis, the
Court of Military Appeals chose the third method and found that
because the investigators, through clarification questions, had
determined what the suspect was asking, they were correct in
continuing the questioning."8
149. Id. at 525-26.
150. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 528-29.
151. Id. at 529. This is also referred to as "less than an all-inclusive request"
for counsel. Id.
152. Id. at 528.
153. Id. The respondent argued that Bradshaw and Edwards had given broad
effect to requests for counsel. Id. The Court opined that only an ambiguous
statement would need to be interpreted, and in this case the Court determined that
the respondent's request was clear and was honored by the police. Id. The Court
noted that because it rejected any claim that the statement was an ambiguous or
equivocal response, there was no reason to address the question that Smith left
open. Id. Smith left open the question of the varying approaches the lower courts
were using to deal with ambiguous requests for counsel. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 98.
In Barrett, Justice Brennan concurred in the result, but for different reasons. See
Barrett, 479 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan affirmed because
the state eliminated any apparent ambiguity of the situation by showing the waiver
was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Id. at 531. Justice Brennan contended that
if the respondent had not asserted that he fully understood his rights, he could not
have concurred with the result. Id. at 533. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, dissented. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 530 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
dissented for two reasons, first, the facts did not give rise to any significant issue,
therefore, certiorari should not have been granted. Id. at 530. Second, the
respondent's statement was no less ambiguous than the statement in Edwards where
the Court found the statement inadmissible. Id.
154. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353-54.
155. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (Cal. 1975).
156. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980).
157. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979).
158. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341-42.
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The Supreme Court rejected this method and adopted the
second approach and set an extremely high standard of clarity
that the suspect's request must meet. 5 ' With Davis, the Su-
preme Court made it clear that if during custodial interrogation
a suspect said almost anything less articulate than, "I want a
lawyer" then police can completely ignore the suspect's state-
ment and continue questioning.""
The Davis decision makes law enforcement more difficult
because it forces police officers to determine what is an ambigu-
ous statement. Ambiguity is different than unintelligible or
inaccurate language. Words are ambiguous when they can be
given more than one meaning by individuals trained to under-
stand the particular words being used."' Case law books and
law review articles are replete with page-after-page explanations
of interpretation standards to settle disputes that arise when
ambiguous language is found in a contract. Davis places this
difficult determination of when a statement is ambiguous on the
interrogating officer who is untrained in determining what the
legal field considers ambiguous and may often be biased.
The holding in Davis places the burden on the suspect to
prove that he positively invoked his right to counsel. In Johnson,
the Supreme Court noted that a suspect was normally presumed
not to have waived his right to counsel.'62 Johnson required
the prosecutor to show that any alleged waiver was given know-
ingly and intelligently.6 3 Further, Miranda held that the po-
lice investigator had a positive duty to inform the suspect of his
right to counsel." With a single case, the Supreme Court
shifted the burden of proving that the suspect invoked his right
to counsel from the less than neutral interrogating officer to the
scared, intimidated and probably less knowledgeable suspect.
Finally, Davis is antithetical to the basic reasoning in Powell
and the case law that followed Powell. The safeguards erected
since Powell will remain dormant because a scared, legally un-
trained, probably uneducated, possibly non-English speaking
suspect does not put his request in perfect King's English. This
holding is in direct opposition with the landmark cases handed
down since Powell."6 ' In Powell, the Court's very reason for of-
159. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
160. Id. at 2356-57.
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79-80 (6th ed. 1990).
162. Johnson, 462 U.S. at 464.
163. Id. at 469. For further discussion of Johnson see notes 67-73 and accompa-
nying text.
164. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
165. The Court in Powell noted that even intelligent and literate men might
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fering further protection to a suspect, was because of the vul-
nerable position a suspect is put into during custodial interroga-
tion. The Court properly determined that this hostile environ-
ment demanded certain safeguards to protect the suspect's
rights.
16
The Supreme Court in Gideon had overruled Betts and re-
turned to the logic and reasoning of Powell.' The Gideon
Court rediscovered how fundamental and essential the right to
assistance of counsel is in the adversarial system. Miranda's
language surely demands a different result than that reached in
Davis. The Court in Miranda asserted that if the accused indi-
cates "in any manner and at any stage of the process" his desire
to speak to an attorney, further questioning must stop. 6 ' The
words, "any manner" clearly place the burden on the police in-
terrogator to determine if the suspect's statement is in "any
manner" a request for counsel. The only way an officer can do
this is by asking further questions, maybe as simple as, "are you
asking to speak with an attorney?" A yes or no answer to that
question would leave little doubt to the interrogator or to the
courts as to what the suspect meant by his statement.
In both Barrett and Smith the Court avoided addressing the
issue of ambiguous requests for counsel. In both cases, the Su-
preme Court found that there Was nothing ambiguous in the
suspect's request for counsel.'69 The Court instead focused on
the separate issue of whether he subsequently waived his right
to counsel after the suspect made his clear request. That analy-
sis was satisfactory for those cases, but when the request is
ambiguous, to allow the questioning to continue nullifies the
reasoning of the Court since Powell.
As with Betts, Davis will be criticized, and eventually a case
will present itself which will give the Court an opportunity to
overrule Davis. If Davis is not overruled then suspects who
make statements like, "I'd like to call Mr. Smith," will be ig-
nored because the interrogator did not know that Mr. Smith was
the accused's lawyer. Further, a statement like, "my lawyer told
me never to speak to police without him" may be considered
not understand the criminal procedures of a trial. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
Gideon draws substantially from Powell's review of the dangers that a scared and
undereducated suspect faces during a custodial interrogation. See Gideon, 372 U.S.
at 341. Miranda placed a positive duty on investigators to make suspects aware of
their rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 344.
166. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
167. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-45.
168. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
169. See Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529; Smith, 469 U.S. at 95-96.
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ambiguous and therefore could be ignored. If the interrogator
thinks that the statement is ambiguous he can ignore the state-
ment and continue questioning. Only by holding that when an
ambiguous request is .made, all substantive questioning must
stop, and by requiring clarifying questions, can the accused's
right to assistance of counsel be protected. 7 '
John T. Reed
170. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
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